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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SURVEY
INTRODUCTION
Since its enactment, the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA")I has accounted for a major
portion of United States environmental law litigation. One of the coun-
try's most important environmental policies, CERCLA was designed to
provide funding and enforcement authority for cleaning up thousands of
existing hazardous waste sites and responding to hazardous substance
spills.2 While the tenets and substance of both environmental law and
CERCLA litigation shift and settle into place, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals continues to help shape and direct the law in these developing
areas. In 1993, the Tenth Circuit remained one of the leading appellate
courts in the country to interpret CERCLA, and this Survey discusses three
cases decided by that court.
In United States v. Colorado,3 the court determined the effect of CER-
CLA on the ability of a state to enforce its own environmental regulation
at a federal facility. In New Mexico Environment Department v. Foulston,4 the
court examined an attempt by a bankruptcy trustee to avoid CERCLA lia-
bility by abandoning property that had been contaminated by hazardous
waste. In United States v. Hardage,5 the court considered the effect of in-
demnification agreements between a generator and a transporter of haz-
ardous waste on their CERCLA liability.
I. CERCLA v. RCRA - THE ROLE OF THE STATES IN ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW: UNITED STA TES V. COL ORADO6
A. Background
Congress established CERCLA in 1980 to deal with thousands of inac-
tive and abandoned hazardous waste sites in the United States. 7 In enact-
ing CERCLA, Congress created a mechanism to guarantee available
funding for the cleanup of seriously contaminated sites.8 CERCLA directs
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to identify sites at which
hazardous substances that threaten the public health and safety may have
been released, identify the parties potentially responsible for the site or
1. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767, amended by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
2. See Major William D. Turkula, Determining Cleanup Standards for Hazardous Waste Sites,
135 MIL. L. REv. 167, 173 (1992).
3. 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994).
4. 4 F.3d 887 (10th Cir. 1993), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb. 1, 1994) (No. 93-1268).
5. 985 F.2d 1427 (10th Cir. 1993).
6. 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994).
7. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CA.N.
6119, 6119.
8. See id.
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the releases, and ensure that these responsible parties pay for the cleanup
of the sites.9 When responsible parties cannot be identified or pay the
amount of cleanup costs, CERCLA's "Superfund" provision is triggered,
and established government and industry funds are tapped in order to
achieve cleanup.10
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA")"
was created as a cradle-to-grave regulatory program for hazardous
wastes. 12 Like CERCLA, RCRA specifies methods of hazardous waste
cleanup and provides for corrective or remedial action once a hazardous
release has occurred due to improper waste management.' 3 RCRA em-
ploys a nationwide permit program to enforce government standards for
acceptable levels of specific contaminants.
14
Congress saw the need for states to have primary regulatory authority
over hazardous waste activities so they could protect their own territo-
ries.15 RCRA allows any state to administer an independent, EPA-ap-
proved hazardous waste program within state boundaries, provided that
the program is at least as stringent as RCRA.16 More than 40 states pres-
ently participate in such programs. 17 At issue in United States v. Colorado
was whether a state which had been authorized to carry out such a hazard-
ous waste program under RCRA could be precluded from doing so at a
hazardous waste facility owned and operated by the federal government
where a CERCLA response action was already underway.' 8
B. Facts
Since 1942, the United States Department of the Army has owned and
operated a chemical munitions facility outside Denver, Colorado known as
the Rocky Mountain Arsenal ("Arsenal").1 9 In 1947, the Army began leas-
ing portions of this 27 square-mile site to private corporations, primarily
Shell Oil Company, that used the facility to develop, test, manufacture,
9. CERCLA § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988).
10. See Comment, Superfund at Square One: Promising Statutory Framework Requires Forceful
EPA Implementation, 11 ENVrL. L. RPTr. 10101, 10102 (1981).
11. Pub. L. No. 94-580,90 Stat. 2795, amended &y the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amend-
ments of 1984 ("HSWA"), Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
12. H.R. RP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120.
13. See Donald A. Brown, EPA's Resolution on the Conflict Between Cleanup Costs and the Law
in Setting Cleanup Standards Under Superfund 15 COLUM. J. ENVrrL. L. 241, 273 (1990).
14. RCRA § 3005, 42 U.S.C. § 6925 (1988) (authorizing the EPA to promulgate regula-
tions requiring permits for treatment, storage or disposal of hazardous waste).
15. SeeJ.B. Wolverton, Note, Sovereign Immunity and National Priorities: Enforcing Federal
Facilities' Compliance with Environmental Statutes, 15 HARv. ENVT.. L. REV. 565, 598 (1991).
16. RCRA § 3006(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (1988).
17. David W. Steuber et al., Toxic and Environmental Coverage Litigation, in 455 PLI Lrr.
& ADMIN. PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK 223, available in WESTLAW, Environmental Database
(ENV-TP), *2-3.
18. United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1572-74. Also at issue was whether the state
was precluded from initiating its own hazardous waste program at a site that the EPA had
placed on the National Priorities List (NPL). Id.
19. United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1067 (D. Colo. 1985).
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and package pesticides, herbicides, and other chemicals. 20 The Army built
a common sanitary sewer system and waste disposal system to handle the
daily wastes produced by its own production of chemical agents as well as
those of the corporate lessees.
2 '
The Army and Shell proceeded to discharge millions of gallons of
liquid waste into unlined natural ground depressions.2 2 In addition, they
buried solid waste and munitions in unlined pits, ultimately causing severe
damage to neighboring farmland and livestock via Arsenal-contaminated
well water.2 3 To ameliorate this problem, the Army, in 1956, commenced
construction and operation of Basin F, an asphalt-lined surface impound-
ment, to store and dispose of chemical manufacturing by-products. 2 4 The
ultimate failure of Basin F, along with the Arsenal's entire waste disposal
system, created what may be one of the worst hazardous and toxic waste
sites in America.
25
In 1975, the Colorado Department of Health ("CDH") issued three
cease and desist orders mandating that the Army and Shell clean up all
sources of designated chemicals, undertake a ground water monitoring
program, and cease certain chemical discharges. 26 In 1982, CDH, the
Army, Shell, and the EPA reached an agreement regarding removal,
remediation, and other response actions to meet requirements under
both CERCLA and RCRA.
27
In 1984, the EPA authorized Colorado to implement the Colorado
Hazardous Waste Management Act ("CHWMA") in lieu of the federal
RCRA program. 28 In 1986, the CDH issued its own Basin F closure plan,
after rejecting an Army closure plan as inadequate. 29 The state then sued
the Army as operator of Basin F under the CHWMA, citing violations of
ground water protection regulations.
3 0
In 1986, the Army stopped complying with RCRA, claiming that CER-
CLA's comprehensive scheme precluded additional application of state
RCRA programs at federal facilities. 3 1 Declaring that the site would be cle-
aned up pursuant to CERCLA requirements, the Army subsequently ig-
nored the CHWMA's Basin F closure plan. 32 Colorado then amended its




22. See Vicky L. Peters et al., Can States Enforce RCRA at Superfund Sites? The Rocky Moun-
tain Arsenal Decision, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10419, 10419 (Aug., 1993).
23. Id.
24. Colorado v. United States Dep't of the Army, 707 F. Supp. 1562, 1563 (D. Colo.
1989).
25. See Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1531 (10th Cir. 1992).
26. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. at 1067.
27. Id. at 1068.
28. 49 Fed. Reg. 41,036 (1984).
29. Army, 707 F. Supp. at 1564.
30. Id
31. Id. at 1565.
32. Id. at 1564-65.
33. Id. at 1564.
1994]
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In Colorado v. United States Dep't of the Army,3 4 the federal district court
denied the Army's motion to dismiss Colorado's enforcement suit, claim-
ing that CERCLA and RCRA were meant to operate individually, and rea-
soned that neither one should be granted more weight than the other in
enforcement actions.3 5 In its decision, the court relied primarily on CER-
CIA § 120(a) (4), which permits application of state laws concerning re-
moval and remedial action at federal facilities that are not listed on
CERCLA's National Priorities List ("NPL").
3 6
Shortly after this decision, Basin F was added to the NPL by the
EPA.37 The Army continued to ignore Colorado's authority, presumably
based on the assumption that the NPL listing precluded compliance with
the court's order. This resulted in the state issuing a compliance order
citing the Army for a variety of additional violations at Basin F and de-
manding submission of a closure plan for state approval.
38
The United States, in an ensuing district court case, sought an order
declaring that Colorado's requests be suspended on the grounds that the
state had no authority to enforce the CHWMA at a CERCLA site.3 9 The
United States argued that CERCLA § 113(h) banned pre-enforcement re-
view.40 The court agreed that any attempt by Colorado to enforce
CHWMA at the Arsenal would require the court to review the Army's CER-
CIA action prior to its completion and that § 113(h) indeed barred such
review.41 The court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of
the United States and enjoined Colorado from enforcing the CHWMA at
Basin F.
4 2
C. Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's order
granting summary judgment for the United States43 and found that
§ 113(h) only bars federal courts from reviewing "challenges" to CERCLA
response actions.44 Relying on a plain interpretation of statutory construc-
tion, the court held that Colorado's RCRA-authorized enforcement action
did not constitute a "challenge" to the Army's CERCLA response action.
45
The Tenth Circuit stated that courts must construe seemingly conflicting
statutes harmoniously to give meaning to every provision, and that to do
otherwise in this particular instance would contravene Congress' express
34. 707 F. Supp. 1562 (D. Colo. 1989).
35. Id. at 1569-70.
36. CERCLA § 120(a) (4), 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(4) (1988).
37. 54 Fed. Reg. 10,512 (1989).
38. CDH Compliance Order No. 89-05-2301.
39. United States v. Colorado, No. CIV.A.89-C-1646, 1991 WL 193519 (D. Colo. Aug. 14,
1991).
40. Id. at *3.
41. Id. at *4.
42. Id. at *5.
43. United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1584.




intentions of having CERCLA and RCRA work simultaneously and
independently.
46
CERCLA's "savings provision" in § 302(d) provides that "[n]othing in
[CERCLA] shall affect or modify in any way the obligations or liabilities of
any person under other Federal or State law, including common law, with
respect to releases of hazardous substances or other pollutants or
contaminants."
47
Similarly, CERCLA § 114(a) provides that "[n]othing in [CERCLA]
shall be construed or interpreted as preempting any State from imposing
any additional liability or requirements with respect to the release of haz-
ardous substances within such State."
48
Relying heavily on these CERCLA provisions, the Tenth Circuit held
that the district court's interpretation of CERCLA § 113(h) was contrary to
the plain meaning of §§ 114(a) and 302(d) because it decreased the
Army's required compliance and liability under CHWMA as well as pre-
empted the state's right to impose additional requirements on the Army.
49
The court accordingly disposed of the United States' reliance on § 113(h)
as a preclusive tool and held that Congress clearly expressed its intent that
CERCLA should interact with other federal and state hazardous waste
laws.50 The court then found that the Arsenal, as a federal facility, was
subject to regulation under RCRA. 51 Moreover, the EPA delegation of
RCRA authority to Colorado subjected the Arsenal to regulation under
CHWMA. 52
The court also held that the district court's interpretation of § 113(h)
was inconsistent with RCRA's citizen suit provision.53 That section pro-
vides citizens, defined to include states, with the power to enforce RCRA
provisions. 54 The court found that because RCRA does not prohibit citi-
zen enforcement suits with respect to hazardous waste sites, Congress
clearly intended that such suits could be allowed even at a site where a
CERCLA response action was underway.
55
The court also dismissed the United States' claim that CERCLA
§ 120(a) (4) precludes any state enforcement action due to the EPA's
placement of Basin F on the NPL.5 6 The court held that placement on
46. Id.
47. CERCLA § 302(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9652(d) (1988).
48. CERCIA § 114(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a) (1988).
49. United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1575-76.
50. Id. at 1575.
51. Id. at 1576.
52. Id. (citing Parola v. Weinberger, 848 F.2d 956, 960 (9th Cir. 1988)) (holding that 42
U.S.C. § 6961 "unambiguously subjects federal instrumentalities to state and local
regulation").
53. United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1577.
54. RCRA § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988).
55. United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1578.
56. Id. at 1580. CERCLA § 120(a) (4) states that "[s] tate laws concerning removal and
remedial action, including State laws regarding enforcement, shall apply to removal and re-
medial action at facilities owned or operated by a department, agency, or instrumentality of
the United States when such facilities are not included on the National Priorities List." 42
U.S.C. § 9620(a)(4) (1988).
19941
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the NPL has no bearing on a federal facility's obligation to comply with
state hazardous waste laws established through an EPA delegation of
RCRA authority. 57 The court relied, in part, on CERCLA § 120(i) 58 which
states that nothing in § 120 "shall affect or impair the obligation of any
department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States to comply
with any requirement" of any RCRA requirements, including those consist-
ing of corrective action. 59
D. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's unanimous decision in United States v. Colorado
serves as strong precedent for the rest of the country. In undertaking the
task of interpreting two of Congress' main environmental statutes, the
Tenth Circuit has unleashed a crucial and viable solution to hazardous
waste cleanup and regulation.
By recognizing that a state may invoke its EPA-authorized RCRA en-
forcement power to compel hazardous waste cleanups, regardless of the
extent or type of federal involvement, the Tenth Circuit established that
the states are authoritatively equivalent to the federal government in over-
seeing and regulating hazardous waste sites. Such a result is a great relief
considering the overall poor track record of the federal government in
cleaning up hazardous waste sites, especially its own.
Despite Congressional directives, EPA implementation of federal haz-
ardous waste statutes has been extremely inept. The Superfund program,
in particular, has been heavily criticized for not achieving more rapid and
efficient cleanups. ° Considering the overall number of contaminated
sites in the United States, Superfund has accomplished very few cleanups
in its regulatory lifetime. For example, of the approximately 1,200 sites on
or proposed for the NPL in 1989, cleanups have been initiated at only 204
of those sites and completed at only 41 sites. 61
A study by Clean Sites concluded that the slow progress of the
Superfund cleanup program is related to the EPA's failure to aggressively
use its potent enforcement authority. 62 Also, nearsighted EPA implemen-
tation of the Superfund program has resulted in utilizing Superfund assets
exclusively to clean up hazardous waste sites rather than attempting to
reach broader CERCLA goals, such as garnering cleanup commitments
from responsible parties.
6 3
57. United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1580.
58. Id.
59. CERCLA § 120(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9620(i) (1988).
60. See, e.g., CLEAN SrrEs, MAKING THE SUPERFUND WORK: RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE
PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION 1 (1989). Clean Sites is an organization developed to help re-
sponsible parties in Superfund cases reach settlements.
61. Oversight of the Environmental Protection Agency's Management Review of the Superfund
Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Supeyfund, Ocean, and Water Protection of the Senate
Comm. on Env't and Public Works, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1989) [hereinafter Hearings] (state-
ment of Richard L. Hembra, Director of Environmental Protection Issues, Resources, Com-
munity, and Economic Development Division, GAO).
62. CLAN SrrEs, supra note 60, at 7.
63. Id. at 7-8.
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Part of this failure by the EPA to aggressively enforce hazardous waste
cleanup is merely a result of bureaucratic red tape.64 In order for the EPA
to issue administrative orders to another federal agency, it must first get
acceptance from the Department of Justice. 65 This requirement leads to
prolonged negotiations, which in turn result in enormously slow responses
to CERCLA by polluters, including federal facilities.
66
CERCLA's past failures to delegate enforcement responsibilities di-
rectly to states, the inability of states to settle cleanup cases with responsi-
ble parties, the EPA's myopic application of Superfund assets, and the
limited enforcement resources available to the EPA all result in a weak
cleanup enforcement system riddled with deficiencies.
67
The Tenth Circuit's decision helps to address these problems as it
provides the EPA with a vehicle to more effectively and immediately com-
bat hazardous waste contamination: individual states. By delegating more
cleanup authority to states, hazardous waste management becomes a more
conspicuous, local responsibility and is ultimately addressed with a greater
degree of concern and diligence.
The Tenth Circuit's lead and Colorado's perseverance in this case
should serve as a model for the development of cooperative and effective
environmental cleanup programs nationwide. The fact that twenty-one
states filed an amicus brief supporting Colorado's position 68 illustrates the
widespread concern, and hopefully the willingness, states have in directly
overseeing hazardous waste cleanup. Allowing states to assume a greater
enforcement role may be the only way to effectively enforce cleanup of the
thousands of hazardous waste sites that presently exist throughout the
United States.
II. IMMUNITY TO ABANDON CONTAMINATED PROPERTIES UNDER THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE: NEW ExICO ENviRONMENT DPAR7TMET
v. FOULSTOA 6 9
A. Background
The Bankruptcy Code of 197870 allows a trustee in bankruptcy, after
notice and a hearing, to abandon property that is "burdensome" or of
"inconsequential value" to the estate. 7 1 This ability to free an estate of
property permits trustees to efficiently convert debtors' property to money
64. See Alana Bissonnette, Comment, Clean Up Your Federal Mess in My State: Colorado Has
a State RCRA-Voice at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, 71 DENV. U. L. REv. 257, 264-65 (1994).
65. Id. at 265 n.83.
66. Id. at 265.
67. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 61 passim
68. The states that filed the amicus curiae brief included Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah and Wyoming.
Amicus Curiae Brief, United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993) (No. 91-
1360).
69. 4 F.3d 887 (10th Cir. 1993), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb. 1, 1994) (No. 93-1268).
70. Bankruptcy Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988)).
71. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988).
1994]
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in order to pay off creditors and satisfies Congressional intent to provide
debtors with a "fresh start."7 2 A conflict arises, however, when debtors at-
tempt to abandon, as "burdensome," polluted property to avoid liability
for the cleanup of the property.
One purpose of CERCLA is to clean up existing environmental con-
tamination by imposing joint and several liability upon any or all parties
responsible for the cleanup.73 Cost recovery from responsible parties is
one of CERCLA's major features, and it attempts to accomplish Congress'
explicit goal of making private polluters bear the full costs of their pollu-
tion. 74 Yet, the critical cost recovery structure of CERCLA is compromised
when polluters use the Bankruptcy Code to avoid responsibility for such
cleanup.
The complexity of CERCLA regulation, the severe liability for non-
compliance with such regulation, and the staggering expenses related to
compliance make attempts to abandon contaminated properties by trust-
ees and debtors in bankruptcy common.75 If abandonment is allowed, a
debtor is then only required to pay for environmental compliance to the
extent the debtor owns assets separate from the bankruptcy estate.
7 6 If
the debtor does not have assets separate from the estate to pay the cost of
cleanup, the contaminated property sits idle until the taxpayers are forced
to pay for the necessary remediation.
77
Therefore, a major conflict arises when a trustee legitimately invokes
the power to abandon an asset when that asset is contaminated property
that poses a risk to public health and safety. In such a situation, should
federal or state environmental statutes restrict a trustee's abandonment
power? Further, if abandonment of contaminated properties should be
restricted, what thresholds of contamination must be met? The Tenth Cir-
cuit addressed these questions in New Mexico Environment Department v.
Foulston.
78
Under the Bankruptcy Code, a trustee's ability to abandon property
where state environmental violations exist was eliminated in most circum-
stances by the Supreme Court's holding in Midlantic National Bank v. New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection.79 In a 5-4 decision, the Court
determined that under § 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee
could not abandon a hazardous waste facility that is burdensome to the
72. See 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1988).
73. See CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C § 9607(a) (1988).
74. See id.
75. See In re FCX, Inc., 96 B.R. 49, 54 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1989).
76. See Thomas G. Gruenert, Environmental Claims in Bankruptcy: Policy Conflicts, Proce-
dural Pitfalls and Problematic Preceden 32 S. TEx. L. Rzv. 399, 439 (1991).
77. See, e.g., City of NewYork v. Quanta Resources Corp. (In re Quanta Resources Corp.),
739 F.2d 912, 921 (3d Cir. 1984), (holding that "[ilf trustees in bankruptcy are to be permit-
ted to dispose of hazardous wastes under the cloak of the abandonment power, compliance
with environmental protection laws will be transformed into governmental cleanup by de-
fault"), aff'd, 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
78. 4 F.3d 887 (10th Cir. 1993), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb. 1, 1994) (No. 93-1268).
79. 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
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estate "in contravention of a state statute or regulation that is reasonably
designed to protect the public health or safety from identified hazards."
80
The Court's decision in Midlantic demanded that a trustee use estate
funds to clean up environmentally hazardous property as the property
cannot be removed from the estate. 81 The decision limits a trustee's aban-
donment power by forcing the trustee to complete all the debtor's
cleanup responsibilities before the estate can be liquidated.8 2 Through
the Midlantic denial of abandonment, estate funds became the economic
source for cleaning up contaminated estate property or paying the EPA or
a state entity to do so, with the same result as if CERCLA or state liability
had been levied against the estate.
Ironically, the seemingly strong pro-environmental decision in
Midlantic also created a loophole for abandonment actions. The Court left
a small window open to interpretation by holding that unless the environ-
mental laws or regulations in question were designed to "protect the pub-
lic health or safety from imminent and identifiable harm," the power to
abandon would be allowed. 83 Interpreting this phrase in Midlantic, courts




Three gas stations, formerly belonging to L.F. Jennings Oil Company,
were contaminated with hazardous substances.8 5 These sites were known
as the Carrizozo Mart ("Carrizozo"), the Midtown Mart 1 ("Midtown"),
and the Capitan Mart ("Capitan"). Jennings filed for bankruptcy protec-
tion under Chapter 7, at which time the trustee of the estate, Foulston,
attempted to sell the three contaminated sites. 86 Foulston, who con-
ducted tests at the sites, found contamination in excess of 100 parts per
million ("ppm") on each site and reported the findings pursuant to state
law to the New Mexico Environment Department ("NMED") prior to the
attempted sales.
8 7
80. Id. at 507.
81. See Kristy Kutz, Note, Who Is Going to Pay: CERCLA v. Bankruptcy, 31 WASHBURN L.J.
573, 600 (1992).
82. See id, The Court stressed the importance of Bankruptcy Code § 959(b), which es-
tablishes that a trustee in bankruptcy must "manage and operate the property in his posses-
sion . . . according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State." Id. at 505.
83. Id. at 507 n.9.
84. A number of courts have permitted abandonment of contaminated properties not
meeting the "imminent and identifiable harm" threshold. See Borden, Inc. v. Wells-Fargo
Business Credit (In reSmith-Douglass, Inc.), 856 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1988); In re Oklahoma Ref.
Co., 63 B.R. 562 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986). Other courts have strictly refused to permit
abandonment and have made the estate fund the entire expense of remediation based on
possible public harm. See In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R 943 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987); In
re Stevens, 68 B.R. 774 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987).




DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Foulston later determined that the properties should be abandoned
pursuant to § 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.8 8 The NMED, although
having notice of the contaminated sites, failed to enter an appearance in
the bankruptcy proceedings and failed to make a timely objection to the
abandonment motions.8 9 The bankruptcy court allowed the trustee to ex-
ercise his abandonment power after concluding that the properties posed
no immediate threat to public health or safety.90 The court denied the
NMED's later motion for reconsideration. 91
The NMED then appealed the decision to the district court which
affirmed the -bankruptcy court's decision denying reconsideration of the
abandonment order. 92 The district court also denied the trustee's motion
to dismiss the appeal as moot for two of the properties that had been
deeded to third-parties by the time the appeal was finally heard.
93
C. Tenth Circuit Decision
On appeal, the NMED claimed that the abandonment power granted
to Foulston violated both the state's environmental laws and the Supreme
Court's ruling in Midlantic.9 4 The Tenth Circuit first ruled that the state's
appeal was indeed moot as to two of the three properties, Carrizozo and
Midtown, because they had already been conveyed to other parties.
95
While the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that Midlantic precluded a bank-
ruptcy trustee from abandoning property in contravention of laws that
protect public health and safety, the court ultimately based its decision on
the narrow "imminent and identifiable harm" exception created in
Midlantic.9 6 The Tenth Circuit held that the Capitan site did not meet this
threshold and therefore the bankruptcy court's order allowing abandon-
ment was correct.
9 7
The court claimed that it was "abundantly clear" from the record that
at the time of abandonment, the Capitan site was not an immediate threat
to public health or safety.98 The court stated that the record showed that:
1) the Capitan site was not listed on the state's list of contaminated sites
indicating the NMED was not considering further testing or investigation
of the site; 2) there was insufficient data for the NMED's expert to say the
property presented an immediate threat; and 3) the bankruptcy trustee's









95. Id. at 888-89. Since the parties continued to raise issues applicable to all three
properties at the appellate level, the court agreed to discuss all three. Id. at 888 n.2.






The NMED failed to adequately address the problems existing at the
Jennings properties. The NMED did not enter an appearance in Jen-
nings' bankruptcy proceeding even though it had notice of the sites' con-
tamination and of Jennings' bankruptcy. 10 0 Although the NMED filed a
motion for reconsideration, the bankruptcy court ruled that the objection
was not made in a timely manner and concluded that abandonment was
allowable. 10 1 The NMED subsequendy appealed the decision but failed to
seek a stay, 10 2 a questionable error and an action that the Tenth Circuit




Congress should amend the Bankruptcy Code and specifically grant
priority to environmental cleanup over abandonment. In the interim, the
courts should take a more active and responsible role in enforcing envi-
ronmental policies in this area. The impairment of environmental
cleanup by abandonment actions compromises the entire national
cleanup effort by diminishing the Superfund and essentially putting envi-
ronmental law policies on the same level as regular debt policies. The
cleanup goals of environmental regulation should not take a back seat to
the abandonment provisions of the Bankruptcy Code or be jeopardized by
varied interpretations of the Midlantic exception.
Further, the Tenth Circuit's presumption that state agency inaction
implied the existence of no substantial public health or safety threat is
frivolous. In Borden, Inc. v. Wells-Fargo Business Credit (In re Smith-Douglass,
Inc.) ,104 a bankrupt Illinois company owned a fertilizer plant in violation
of a variety of state water pollution and hazardous waste laws. As the bank-
ruptcy proceedings began, the state agency monitoring the plant had not
yet pursued any enforcement action against the owner. 10 5 As a result of
this state inaction, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the site
posed no serious health risk as the hazards therein were "speculative."
1 0 6
The dangerous presumption that state agency inaction sufficiently
gauges the public health threat posed by a contaminated site emerged in
Borden. The Tenth Circuit's decision in Foulston also established this link,
perpetuating a disturbing trend. State agency inactivity regarding existing
environmental law violations should be only one of many factors consid-
ered when determining the immediate threat to public health or safety.
The Foulston court held that the Capitan site posed no "immediate"
threat to public health and safety, and as a result did not meet the "no
abandonment" threshold established by the Supreme Court in Midlan-
100. Md at 888.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 890.
104. 856 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1988).
105. Id. at 14-15.
106. Id. at 16.
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tic.
1 0 7 Yet, the Midlantic holding calls for a finding of "imminent and iden-
tifiable" harm, not "immediate" harm. 108 Imminent and immediate are
not synonymous, and the outcome of a case may well turn on how a court
characterizes the threat. 10 9 The Court in Midlantic explicitly held that
Congress' intent behind CERCLA was to prevent imminent endanger-
ment. 110 Courts have warned that any attempt to limit "imminent danger"
to "immediate danger" amounts to "gambling with human lives." 111
While the Capitan site might not have presented an apparent "imme-
diate" threat to public health or safety, the site did pose an "imminent"
threat. 1 2 While the contaminated soil of the site might not "instantly"113
affect anyone's health or safety, future harm due to the untreated contam-
ination certainly remains "impending" and "likely to occur."1 14 Such a dis-
tinction should be instilled in a court ruling on abandonment cases as
property abandoned through such actions in most cases winds up in the
hands of unsuspecting, good-faith purchasers.
Although the "contamination" in excess of 100 ppm at each of the
three Foulston sites was not described specifically, it is commonly known
that gasoline contains many hazardous elements. The EPA has recognized
that gasoline lead, through its presence in air, dirt, and dust, is the leading
cause of lead poisoning.1 15 Besides lead, gasoline also contains benzene, a
known carcinogen. 1 16 Epidemiological and animal studies indicate that
exposure to benzene results in high rates of leukemia, kidney cancer, and
liver cancer. 1 7 Exposure to concentrations of benzene as low as 250-500
ppm result in nausea, breathlessness, and vertigo while constant exposure
to low concentrations results in non-functioning bone marrow and defi-
107. Foulston, 4 F.3d at 890.
108. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507 n.9.
109. See Rick M. Reznicsek, Note, International Environmental Bankruptcy: An Overview of
Environmental Bankruptcy Law, Including a State's Claims Against the Multinational Polluter, 23
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 345, 362 (1990).
110. Id. at 506 (citing CERCLA § 106, 42 U.S.C. § 9606).
111. See, e.g., Freeman Coal Mining Co. v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operations Appeals, 504
F.2d 741, 744 (7th Cir. 1974).
112. See, e.g., Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1356 (2nd Cir. 1991) (conclud-
ing that an activity that presents imminent endangerment does not require a finding of im-
mediate or even threatened actual harm), rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992); United States
v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361, 1394 (D. N.H. 1985) (holding that "imminency"
does not require a finding that actual harm will occur immediately so long as risk of
threatened harm exists); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (holding
that "[c]ase law and dictionary definition agree that endanger means something less than
actual harm"), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA,
465 F.2d 528, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (approving of the EPA's conclusion that the final antici-
pated injury need not occur prior to a determination that an 'imminent hazard' exists).
113. Immediate following without the lapse of appreciable time; done or occurring at
once; instant. FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW "STANDARD" DIcIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
1230 (1961).
114. Imminent. threatening to happen at once, as some calamity; dangerous and close at
hand; impending. Id.
115. See Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. United States EPA, 705 F.2d 506,
528-29 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
116. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Reilly, 983 F.2d 259, 261 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1993)




ciencies in the elements of the blood.' 18 Therefore, if these abandoned
properties are eventually used for any type of high-traffic use, such as resi-
dential or commercial development, public health and welfare may be-
come unnecessarily and irresponsibly imperiled.
In allowing abandonment of the Capitan site based on a finding that
the site posed no "immediate" threat to public health and safety, the bank-
ruptcy court, the district court, and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals all
misapplied the Midlantic "imminent and identifiable" exception. Consid-
ering the precedential value of the Tenth Circuit decision, such an error
in interpretation could lead to unremediated environmental contamina-
tion. Had the proper test been applied, the court would have had no
choice but to conclude that the accumulated contamination exceeded safe
exposure levels and at least constituted "imminently" dangerous condi-
tions. The Tenth Circuit should have been able to reach this conclusion
without first requiring such a finding by a state agency.
While the Tenth Circuit's view of the Supreme Court's "imminent
and identifiable" exception efficiently promotes the Bankruptcy Code's
"fresh start" policy, the interpretation also undermines CERCLA's policy
of placing the responsibility for environmental cleanup costs on those who
caused the contamination. While Midlantic dealt with state statutes and
regulations and not CERCLA, CERCLA clearly is "reasonably calculated to
protect the public health or safety" from harm and should be allowed to
limit the power of abandonment and trump weaker and insufficient state
laws when they fail to ensure environmental protection. Until Congress
specifically prioritizes a specific objective, courts will follow the lead of
Foulston and continue to uphold abandonment at the expense of crucial
environmental policies.
III. INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENTS BETWEEN CERCLA RESPONSIBLE
PARTIES FOR CLEANuP LIABILITY- UNITED STATES V. HARDAGE) 19
A. Background
When the EPA incurs response costs in cleaning up hazardous waste,
it may bring actions to recover the costs against any or all potentially re-
sponsible parties ("PRPs"). 120 CERCLA § 107(a) defines four classes of
PRPs: present owners or operators of facilities contaminated by or con-
taining hazardous substances, past owners or operators of such facilities,
persons who arrange for disposal or treatment of hazardous substances,
and persons who accept for transportation hazardous substances and se-
lect the disposal facility.
12 1
PRPs often enter into indemnification or hold harmless agreements
in order to transfer liability for any cleanup responsibility they may incur
118. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 498 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 448
U.S. 607 (1980).
119. 985 F.2d 1427 (10th Cir. 1993).
120. CERCLA §§ 104(a), 107(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a), 9607(a) (1988).
121. CERCLA § 107(a)(1)-(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (1988).
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under CERCLA.122 PRPs attach great importance to these agreements as
the financial consequences arising out of CERCLA's strict liability for
cleanup are usually very burdensome. Very few PRPs today enter into con-
tracts without considering or bargaining for the inclusion of some kind of
indemnification clause.1 23  ,
Notwithstanding these facts, it remains uncertain whether CERCLA
allows allocation of liability between PRPs. CERCLA § 107(e) (1) states:
No indemnification, hold harmless, or similar agreement or con-
veyance shall be effective to transfer from the owner or operator
of any vessel or facility or from any person who may be liable for
a release or threat of release under this section, to any other per-
son the liability imposed under this section. Nothing in this sub-
section shall bar any agreement to insure, hold harmless, or
indemnify a party to such agreement for any liability under this
section.
124
The seemingly contradictory language of these two sentences has di-
vided courts considering whether CERCLA allows the contractual alloca-
tion of financial responsibility for hazardous waste cleanup.1 25 The Tenth
Circuit addressed the issue in United States v. Hardage.
B. Facts
From 1973 to 1979, United States Pollution Control, Inc. ("USPCI")
transported waste products produced by various parties to the Royal N.
Hardage Industrial Waste Site (Hardage Site) near Criner, Oklahoma. 126
One of the hazardous waste producers was the McDonnell-Douglas Corpo-
ration ("MDC") with whom USPCI had contracted to transport 250,000
gallons of waste to the Hardage site.1 27 The contracts specified that
USPCI would hold McDonnell-Douglas harmless from any claim of loss
resulting from the transport of the waste as well as any liability, obligations,
or costs possibly created by USPCI.
128
Environmental officials eventually identified hazardous wastes at the
Hardage site and named both USPCI and MDC as PRPs, whereupon each
sought indemnification from the other.' 29 USPCI claimed that it had pro-
tected itself by. including indemnification clauses on its standard-form
122. See, e.g., Commander Oil Corp. v. Advance Food Serv. Equip., 991 F.2d 49, 50-51
(2nd Cir. 1993); Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Kop-Coat, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1022, 1023 (N.D. Cal.
1990), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 973 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1992).
123. Lisl E. Miller, Comment, Indemnification Agreements Under CERCLA, 23 ENwTL. L. 333,
348 (1993).
124. CERCLA § 107(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1) (1988).
125. The majority of courts have interpreted § 10
7
(e) to allow indemnification agree-
ments. See, e.g., Niecko v. Emro Mktg. Co., 973 F.2d 1296, 1300-01 (6th Cir. 1992); Jones-
Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Servs., 959 F.2d 126, 129 (9th Cir. 1992), superseded by,
973 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1992). Yet a minority of courts have found that § 107(e) precludes
independent indemnification contracts. See, e.g., AM Int'l, Inc. v. International Forging
Equip., 743 F. Supp. 525, 528-30 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
126. Hardage, 985 F.2d at 1431-32.
127. Id. at 1433.
128. Id. at 1434.
129. Id. at 1432.
[Vol. 71:4
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
shipping tickets. The tickets stated that MDC and the government agreed
to indemnify USPCI against all liability which MDC or the government
might cause or create.
1 30
The district court granted summary judgment for MDC against
USPCI on the indemnification provisions contained in the contracts, hold-
ing that USPCI's shipping ticket indemnification language was inapplica-
ble.13 1 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision,
concluding that liability had been legitimately transferred to USPCI as a
result of broad language favoring MDC found in the parties' various in-
demnification clauses.'
3 2
C. Tenth Circuit Decision
In affirming the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit found the
plain meaning of § 107(e) (1) prevented PRPs from altogether transfer-
ring their liability, but gave them the right to obtain indemnification for
that liability. 133 In other words, there can be no transfer of liability to the
government or to anyone else, but financial responsibility can be trans-
ferred. As the Tenth Circuit did not delve into a detailed analysis of
§ 107(e) (1), it is important to note the cases the court relied upon to vali-
date indemnification agreements.
The court cited Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd.,i5 4 a Ninth Circuit
case holding that section 107(e) (1) "expressly preserves agreements ... to
indemnify a party held liable under 107(a)." 1 35 The Mardan court ex-
plained that "[b]y preserving such agreements, Congress seems to have ex-
pressed an intent to preserve the associated body of state law under which
agreements between private parties would normally be interpreted."S
6
The court also cited Purolator Products Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc.,137 in
which a federal district court held that liable parties under CERCLA can
contractually shift responsibility for their response costs among each
other, but can in no way escape their liability to the government or a third
party.13 8 The Purolator court held that allowing indemnification agree-
ments did not hamper CERCLA's goal of recovering moneys for cleanup
because the government could still recover from a responsible party.13 9
Relying on Oklahoma law, the Hardage court found that while an in-
demnification agreement must "clearly and unequivocally express an in-
tent to exculpate," it need not refer to specific acts that will invoke the
clause. 140 The court explained that "such an intent may be found where
130. Id. at 1434.
131. Id. at 1432.
132. Id. at 1436.
133. Id. at 1433.
134. 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986).
135. Id. at 1458.
136. Id.
137. 772 F. Supp. 124 (W.D.N.Y. 1991).
138. Id. at 129.
139. 1d. at 129-30.
140. Hardage, 985 F.2d at 1434.
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the language of the indemnification is so broad and all-inclusive that it
necessarily sweeps all events-including those occurring because of the
indemnitee's actions-into its coverage."
14 1
The court found that MDC was entitled to indemnification from
USPCI based on an indemnification clause found in two transport and
disposal contracts that indemnified all losses "resulting from" the transpor-
tation or disposal of MDC's hazardous waste. 142 The court held that the
term "resulting from" was the type of "all-inclusive and unambiguous lan-
guage" sufficient to relieve MDC from its CERCLA-imposed strict liabil-
ity.143 In contrast, the court concluded that the "caused or created"
language used in USPCI's shipping tickets failed to create any indemnifi-
cation because such language lacked the required breadth found in
MDC's language.
1 44
After contracting to use the Hardage Site for hazardous waste dispo-
sal, USPCI then approached various "customers" including MDC, and pro-
posed the Hardage Site as a feasible hazardous waste dump site. 145
Upholding the district court's ruling, the Tenth Circuit stated that CER-
CLA § 107(a) (4) establishes transporter liability if site selection is chosen




Although courts have differed over the ambiguous language of CER-
CLA § 107(e), it is clear that allowing for indemnification contracts be-
tween PRPs is the correct course for courts to take if hazardous waste
problems are to be aggressively and potently remediated. By allowing for
indemnification agreements between the PRPs in Hardage, the Tenth Cir-
cuit effectively supported the aims of CERCLA by assuring that polluters
pay for their mess regardless of how payment is accomplished.
While a PRP remains fully liable to the government regardless of any
indemnification contracts entered into, 147 such agreements allow a PRP
the opportunity to contractually transfer financial responsibility arising
out of such liability. Therefore, a party indemnified by another liable
party is vested with the incentive to voluntarily clean up hazardous sub-
stances or wastes on its site as it can recover response costs directly from
the other liable party.
141. Id. at 1434-35.
142. Id. at 1434.
143. Id. at 1435.
144. Id. at 1435-36.
145. Id. at 1435 n.6.
146. Id. While USPCI averred that MDC "cause or created" USPCI's liability, it was
USPCI's actions as a transporter and selector of the disposal facility that in essence "caused or
created" their liability.
147. See, e.g., Olin Corp. v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 807 F. Supp. 1133, 1140
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that indemnity agreements have "no impact on the central goal of
CERCLA-to hold PRPs, rather than taxpayers, liable for the cost of environmental clean-
up" because the parties remain jointly and severally liable to the government), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 5 F.3d 10 (2d Cir. 1993).
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The minority of courts that have prohibited indemnification agree-
ments between PRPs have done so in contravention of the primary CER-
CLA goals of promoting voluntary cleanup of hazardous waste sites148 and
placing the costs of cleanup on the parties responsible for the contamina-
tion. 14 9 Without indemnification agreements, PRPs who pollute have less
incentive to clean up the contamination since any cleanup costs incurred
would be unreimbursed. In such circumstances, the parties might be con-
tent to sit on their pollution, hoping to escape CERCLA scrutiny and
never pay a penny in remediation costs. Prohibiting indemnification
agreements also causes polluters to seek out indemnity or insurance agree-
ments with parties not liable under CERCLA, thus leaving response costs
to be paid by non-polluting, non-culpable parties.
While the Tenth Circuit's decision in Hardage upheld crucial CER-
CIA objectives, it also helped bolster the critical public policies pro-
pounded in Mardan and Purolator. The freedom to contract was implicitly
referred to in Mardan and stands as a personal right fundamental to the
efficiency of the American legal system.150 The Purolator court found that
Congress left parties free to allocate liability contractually among them-
selves, and noted that such a public policy helped in the ultimate equita-
ble application of CERCLA liability.1
5 '
While the majority of courts remain in favor of the transfer of CER-
CLA financial responsibility through indemnification agreements, a mi-
nority currently exists which is striking down such agreements. Such
action is impinging upon the fundamental right of freedom to contract, a
right which CERCLA expressly reserves.' 52 Any major shift towards the
minority view would harm environmental regulation because diminish-
ment in the freedom to contract would undermine the Congressional in-
tent of equitably allocating hazardous waste cleanup costs to the greatest
number of parties.
While the legislative history behind CERCLA § 107(e) is enigmatic, it
tends to support indemnification agreements. The primary purpose of
§ 107(e) initially was to prevent adhesion contracts and to protect parties
from nondisclosure, purposes that have become unnecessary due to adap-
tation and amendment of the law in those fields. 153 Since preclusion of
indemnification agreements is no longer necessary for the reasons Con-
148. See HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, HAZARDOUS WASTE CON-
TAINMENT ACr OF 1980, H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 17 (1980), reprinted
in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120.
149. See SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, ENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENCY
RESPONSE ACT, S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1980).
150. Article I, § 10 of the United States Constitution provides that "[n]o state.. shall pass
any law impairing the obligation of contracts...." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
151. Purolator, 772 F. Supp. at 134.
152. See, e.g., Hatco Corp. v. W.R Grace & Co-Conn., 801 F. Supp. 1309, 1317 (D.N.J.
1992) (stating that "CERCLA allows parties to privately allocate by contract the risk of loss for
liabilities under [CERCLA]"); Rodenbeck v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 742 F. Supp. 1448,
1456 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (stating that "CERCLA expressly preserves the right of private parties
to contractually transfer to or release another from the financial responsibility arising out of
CERCLA liability").
153. See Miller, supra note 123, at 351.
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gress originally intended, legislative history can not act to invalidate such
agreements. 15 4 Yet, as long as debate over § 107(e)'s legislative history
remains alive, courts will continue to use it as leverage for striking down
indemnification agreements. Congress should take steps to amend CER-
CIA and specifically allow for indemnification agreements between PRPs.
In its delegation of indemnification liability in Hardage, the Tenth Cir-
cuit relied on a very literal interpretation of the language used by the par-
ties in their indemnification attachments. This emphasis on plain
meaning in Hardage should compel individual parties crafting indemnifi-
cation agreements to tailor the language carefully. Using ambiguous, boil-
erplate language for contractual allocation of risk may create unintended
consequences, with neither party receiving bargained-for benefits. 155 Fur-
thermore, parties should expressly incorporate specific state law into their
agreements to ensure that the language of the agreements will actually
protect them.
CONCLUSION
Relying on a plain meaning interpretation of CERCLA, the Tenth Cir-
cuit in United States v. Colorado vested states with the potent ability to regu-
late federal facilities under state RCRA authority. The decision breathes
life back into the EPA's fettered delegation system and adds a much
needed review and enforcement weapon to the nation's environmental
regulation arsenal. The court's decision in United States v. Hardage, recog-
nizing the validity of indemnification agreements between CERCLA re-
sponsible parties, also relied on a plain meaning interpretation of
CERCLA. Hardage follows the majority trend across the country and up-
holds the fundamental freedom to contract as well as crucial CERCIA pol-
icies, including promoting voluntary cleanup of hazardous waste sites and
placing the cost of remediation on those responsible for the pollution.
While the Tenth Circuit's decisions in United States v. Colorado and
Hardage succeeded in upholding Congressional goals of protecting public
health and safety through strict environmental regulation, the court did
not follow that trend in New Mexico Environment Department v. Foulston,
where environmental regulation took a back seat to Bankruptcy Code
policies.
154. For a related view, compare Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 109.1, 1096 n.4 (7th Cir.) (not-
ing that the disagreement among members of Congress regarding the meaning of certain
CERCLA provisions indicates that courts should be reluctant to rely on legislative history),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990). For examples of cases where indemnification agreements
have been granted without reliance on legislative history, see Armotek Indus., Inc. v. Freed-
man, 790 F. Supp. 383, 386-87 (D. Conn. 1992); Hemingway Transp., Inc. v. Kahn (In re
Hemingway Transp., Inc.), 126 B.R. 650, 653 (D. Mass. 1991), aff'd, 954 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1992). But see AM Int'l v. International Forging Equip., 743 F. Supp. 525, 528 (N.D. Ohio
1990) (prohibiting indemnification agreements under § 107(e), finding that the Senate, in
final debates before the passing of CERCLA, "disfavored releases [from liability] except under
strict conditions").
155. Penny L. Parker & John Slavich, Contractual Efforts to Allocate the Risk of Environmental
Liability: Is There a Way to Make Indemnities Worth More Than the Paper They Are Written On?, 44
Sw. L.J. 1349, 1381 (1992).
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Congress should specifically grant environmental policies supremacy
over bankruptcy policies. However, in the face of Congressional inaction,
the courts must act as efficient guardians of the environment themselves
and liberally interpret environmental regulations. The Foulston court's de-
cision rests on a flawed application of Supreme Court precedent and effec-
tively thwarts the environmental goals established in CERCLA.
ShaneJustin Harvey

